UN Security Council to Hold Closed Consultations on South Sudan

Print Share South Sudan: Closed Consultations On Tuesday morning (20 January), Security Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on the situation in South Sudan. The US requested the meeting to discuss political developments in the country and the government’s current posture the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix is expected to brief. The primary driver of instability in South Sudan remains the stalled implementation of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and the erosion of its key provisions. The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC)—a body established to oversee implementation of the R-ARCSS—observed in its latest quarterly report, which was issued on 9 December 2025, that the country’s political and security situations significantly deteriorated during the reporting period of 1 July to 30 September 2025. The report cited in this regard renewed pressures following the 2025 Nasir clashes and increased ceasefire violations involving the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), the government’s forces, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), which is led by First Vice-President Riek Machar. In light of these findings, RJMEC Chief of Staff Berhanu Kebede reportedly warned that the country’s worsening landscape puts “the implementation of the [revitalised agreement] and the conduct of the December 2026 elections at serious risk”. On 17 December 2025, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit approved a series of amendments to the revitalised agreement that removed provisions tying the elections to the completion of a permanent constitution, a process that remains unfinished more than seven years after the R-ARCSS was signed. Pursuant to the changes, polls will instead be conducted under South Sudan’s transitional constitution. This move contravenes key provisions of the peace agreement concerning elections and procedural processes, which stipulate that amendments to the R-ARCSS require approval by two-thirds of the Council of Ministers of the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), two-thirds of the voting members of the RJMEC, and subsequent ratification by the Transitional National Legislature (TNLA). Kiir has also continued to restructure positions within his own faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), through the issuance of successive presidential decrees. In one such recent decree, he reportedly dismissed 11 ministers of the TNLA. The unilateral dismissals directly affected positions allocated to the SPLM-IO under the power-sharing arrangements established under the revitalised agreement. Kiir subsequently appointed to the assembly new members representing the splinter faction of the Machar-led SPLM-IO headed by Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Kuol. It appears that the motivation behind the reshuffle was to remove members of the SPLM-IO faction loyal to Machar, who has been detained after being charged with murder, treason, and crimes against humanity in September 2025. (For background and more information, see the brief on South Sudan in our April 2025 Monthly Forecast as well as 18 March 2025 and 9 November 2025 What’s in Blue stories.) Some analysts have noted that the move could further deepen internal divisions within the SPLM-IO. These actions drew significant criticism from members of the SPLM-IO, South Sudanese civil society organisations, and several international interlocutors. For instance, the Troika on South Sudan (Norway, the UK, and the US) issued a joint statement on 19 December 2025, in which they criticised Kiir for not leading the transitional government of national unity under the terms of the R-ARCSS. They also maintained that the “principles of power-sharing [were] violated and no meaningful progress [has been made] towards implementing the agreement”. On 8 January, the Office of the President reportedly issued a directive banning public media announcements of personnel changes involving government appointments or dismissals by presidential prerogative. Under the new directive, all presidential decrees and appointments are required to be sent directly and confidentially to the appropriate authorities through official correspondence from the Office of the President. The move marks a significant shift from the government’s longstanding practice of announcing the reshuffling of government positions on state media. The new directive applies to a wide range of official positions, including those of parliamentary members in the TNLA and Council of State, senior civil servants, and ministers. According to media reports, the Office of the President argued that such changes are “intended to enhance professionalism, protect the dignity of public office and ensure administrative stability during the transition period”. In addition to the country’s complex political situation, South Sudan’s security landscape remains precarious, with widespread armed confrontations among the SPLM-IO, the SSPDF, and other armed groups reported in several parts of the country. According to UNMISS, these developments continue to severely compromise prospects for sustaining the peace process and for the protection of civilians. Amid growing instability in the country, the African Union (AU) High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee of Five (C5) on South Sudan travelled to South Sudan on 14 and 15 January to evaluate the implementation of the revitalised agreement and review the government’s preparations for the December 2026 elections. The assessment is likely to be discussed at a 19 January AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) meeting that will focus on the situation in South Sudan. In light of these developments, at Tuesday’s meeting, Lacroix and several Council members are likely to urge parties to uphold the ceasefire and exercise maximum restraint. They are also expected to express concern about recent actions by the government that contravene or undermine the revitalised agreement and may urge all leaders to uphold their commitments to implement the agreement, particularly the transitional security arrangements, and to engage in inclusive, consensus-based decision-making. Council members might also call for enhanced civilian protection and collective efforts towards lasting peace and stability in the country. Lacroix is expected to brief on recent developments related to UNMISS’ contingency plan, which is being implemented in response to the UN-wide financial crisis and the Secretary-General’s austerity measures requiring all peacekeeping missions to reduce their expenditures by 15 percent. He is expected to describe his 17-18 December 2025 visit to Juba, where he briefed relevant stakeholders such as senior-level government officials and UNMISS civilian and uniformed personnel on the contingency plan’s implementation. Already underway, the operational changes to UNMISS entail the repatriation of 25 percent of uniformed personnel and their equipment, the closure of certain field offices and bases, and reductions in uniformed and civilian components. Council members are likely to be interested in hearing more details about Lacroix’s visit and may request further information regarding progress in the contingency plan’s implementation. Several members may also raise concerns over the impact of these financial constraints on UNMISS’ mandate delivery amid heightened political tensions and violence in the country. The South Sudanese government’s posturing towards UNMISS is another issue that will be discussed at Tuesday’s consultations. In October 2025, the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally requested that the mission reduce its international military contingents by 70 percent, ground all aircraft with intelligence-gathering capabilities, and close several military bases and civilian protection sites. A white note circulated by the UN Secretariat to Council members in early December 2025 apparently emphasised that measures under the contingency plan requiring host government facilitation, particularly troop rotations and repatriation as well as movement of heavy equipment, have also faced significant impediments. Since October 2025, extensive diplomatic efforts have taken place between Juba and New York to address these issues and communicate the impact of these delays on the financial stability and future of the mission. Although the South Sudanese government reiterated its willingness to cooperate and clarified that its requests were considerations rather than conditions, it issued a note verbale in November 2025 that called for the closure of the Wau and Bentiu bases, the repatriation of personnel along with their weapons, and comprehensive plans for handling heavy contingent-owned equipment. The delays have apparently led to an increase in monthly expenses for the mission. It seems that the white note warned that if the current situation continues, UNMISS will exhaust its financial resources by March and may need to prepare for a possible cessation of operations. On 15 December 2025, South Sudan sent a letter to the Security Council, in which it set out its views on UNMISS’ contingency plan. The letter rejected allegations that the South Sudanese government has created obstacles to the repatriation or rotation of UNMISS troops. Among other things, it also argued that the South Sudanese government had not been informed in advance of UNMISS’ contingency plan and that it was finalised without the consent of the host government. At Tuesday’s meeting, several Council members are likely to be interested in learning more from Lacroix on how the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) intends to work closely with the South Sudanese government to minimise the contingency plan’s effects on UNMISS’ efforts to protect civilians and support the peace process, as well as on its efforts to address the government’s concerns and requests. Print Share