Russia Accuses Patriarch Bartholomew of Treachery Amid Church Autocephaly Dispute

The statement accused Bartholomew, who holds a primacy of honour among the Orthodox Churches, of “treachery”, claiming that he was gradually taking over Orthodox churches all over “the lands of Eastern Europe” and was also willing to act against the “especially obstinate” – and markedly pro-Russian – Serbian Orthodox Church, SOC, the dominant Church in Montenegro. The accusations come amid the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has affected the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate’s ability to operate across much of Eastern Europe, instigating scrutiny over its role in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova. Russia’s security service assessment about the Montenegrin Orthodox Church being the next in line for autocephaly reopens an issue that could reinvigorate old debates about canonical borders in the Balkans. Baltics first, Montenegro next? Russian intelligence claims that the Ecumenical Patriarchate wants to assume control over several Orthodox Churches that are currently subordinated to the Moscow patriarchate – and has now “turned his black eye” on the three Baltic states, where he is “obsessed with the idea of displacing Russian Orthodoxy”. “Relying on ideological allies in the form of local nationalists and neo-Nazis, he is attempting to tear the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Orthodox Churches away from the Moscow Patriarchate,” the Russian statement claimed. Both Estonia and Latvia have substantial ethnic Russian minorities. Considering the implications of the war in Ukraine on Orthodox geopolitics, Emil Bjørn Hilton Saggau, a Research fellow at Lund University in Sweden, has told BIRN that certain parallels between the Baltics and the Balkans can be made, as “both regions have been embroiled in canonical conflicts” following the creation of new nation-states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which he said has been a “central factor driving church-related conflicts”. However, the two regions have responded very differently to the war in Ukraine. “The Baltic states have pursued a politics of delineation toward the Russian state and its church,” Saggau noted. “Consequently, the local Russian Orthodox Churches in the Baltics have experienced severe political pressure to cut all ties with Moscow. “This is not the case in most of the Balkans, where the Serbian Orthodox Church has, over the past two years, made it quite clear that its hierarchy stands together with the Russians, particularly regarding Church-related issues in Ukraine,” he added. A Church struggling for survival The MnOC describes itself as the successor to the historic Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which was abolished in 1920, and which its supporters claim, existed as a separate, autocephalous body before Montenegro was forcibly incorporated into union with the Kingdom of Serbia at the end of World War I. Supporters of this claim also cite historical documents, including the Montenegrin Orthodox Church’s founding documents such as its 1903 constitution, which states that the Church is autocephalous. A body using the same name was founded in October 1993, as Yugoslavia started to dissolve. But it is still not recognised by any of the other Orthodox churches. And it has struggled, especially since the 2020 elections and change of government and the subsequent signing of the “Fundamental Agreement” between the Montenegrin government and the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has cemented the Serbian Church’s dominance over Montenegrin religious life. The breakaway Montenegrin Church relied heavily on the former ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS, and on state support before 2020, Marko Vekovic, Associate Professor of Religion and Politics at the University of Belgrade, commented. “The DPS backed and instrumentalised the MnOC to counter what it saw as Serbian influence through the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially in culture, tradition, and even politics, thus making the SOC a focal point of identity in Montenegro,” he told BIRN. He added: “The Montenegrin state and DPS support allowed the MnOC to mask its two biggest and important weaknesses – a lack of clergy and very low membership numbers.” A precise estimate of the number of MnOC adherents is unobtainable, as no official records exist and it is subject to various interpretations. The Church has also suffered from a damaging internal dispute about its leader, making any such assessment even harder. The 2024 Christmas Yule Log, or badnjak celebration descended into scuffles between supporters of Metropolitan Mihailo (Dedeic), who has headed the Church since 1997, and Metropolitan Boris (Bojovic), who has claimed the same title since September 2023, further splitting the already small community of believers into two rival factions, each recognising a different claimant to the church’s top leadership. Metropolitan Boris told BIRN that gaining autocephaly is a process, and that his Church will “follow the Mother Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, in everything”. Asked whether autocephaly was a current goal for the Church, he answered that it was not just a goal but a “necessity”, because “through the actions of the Church of Serbia, and from the altars that our ancestors erected, assimilationist and openly hostile actions are being taken against the Montenegrin nation, Church and language. “We are obliged to strongly strengthen the conditions for the promotion of our [Montenegrin] spiritual and ecclesiastical identity and uniqueness,” he added. Hopes raised by Ukraine’s example The Ecumenical Patriarchate meanwhile dismissed the Russian claims the day after they were published, calling them imaginative scenarios and fake news. It stated that insults and fabricated information “do not discourage the Ecumenical Patriarchate from continuing its ministry and ecumenical mission”. But, despite the rebuttal of the Russian claims, Metropolitan Boris drew encouragement from the statement, as, according to him, the text did not directly rule out eventual autocephaly for the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. “We may recall the statements of the Ecumenical Patriarchate about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate, so that narrative also changed, as the situation arose to approve autocephaly,” he told BIRN, referring to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s still controversial decision to grant the Ukrainian Church autocephaly, much to the fury of Moscow. Bartholomew’s decision to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019 gave the topic of autocephaly new traction in Montenegro. However, Bartholomew has repeatedly rejected the idea that the MnOC can be granted autocephaly. It is “very unlikely” and even “implausible” that the Ecumenical Patriarch could change course on Montenegro, given that he has twice anathematised the leaders of the MnOC, recalled Emil Bjørn Hilton Saggau, whose research focuses on the Orthodox Churches of Southeastern Europe. “The Montenegrin Orthodox Church has been in decline, due to internal divisions and changes in government and public opinion in 2020–2021,” he added. Meanwhile, the Serbian Church maintains a hard line against any talk of autocephaly, insisting that the Montenegrin Church in the past was never autocephalous. Vekovic told BIRN that when it comes to how the SOC perceives the question of the independence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, the answer is: “It is openly and clearly against it. “Such an attitude is not actually something that is debatable within the Church. None of the SOC’s Bishops or clergy hold any other opinion on this matter,” he concluded.