Iran's Gambit: Navigating the Shifting Sands of the New Middle East

Introduction As the Iranian government cracks down on recent protests, President Donald Trump has assured insurgents “help is on the way”. Surprisingly, US allies Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have made clear that their territories and airspace will not be used by America to launch an attack on Iran. These protests arose from a currency crisis and governmental repressive fundamentalism, with brutal treatment of dissidents and intensive surveillance measures. The regime also targets women and girls with mandatory veiling (non-compliance begets flogging and, in some cases, execution) and impunity for male officials who attack women who dress immodestly. As state violence and reactionary neo-conservativism flourish under Trump’s regime, international observers must question the motives of this promised ‘help’. Geo-political Signalling in the Gulf State’s Non-compliance The US previously used its military bases in Qatar (its largest in the Middle East) in operations such as Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Iraqi Freedom, and Inherent Resolve (targeting ISIS). The Saudi Arabian bases were used during the 1991 Gulf War and again during the 2003 Iraq invasion. Refusal this time is not for lack of precedence. As a nascent state in the region, Qatar endured years of “protectorate colonialism” under British indirect rule, only beginning to consolidate national identity during the 1960s – using oil revenues to invest in society-building programmes. Nowadays, boasting the global highest per capita income, and some of its most lenient regulations, Qatar has become a Middle Eastern diplomatic Switzerland. Qatar’s Emir (Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani) explains the nation “aims to bring different points of view together […] to play a role of facilitator, in the region and beyond”. Regarding Iran, he aspired for a “peaceful settlement” of US-Iranian rivalries in 2022, but the foreign minister emphasises that the Qatari-US partnership is “the most important”. While formal diplomacy may favour the US, non-compliance regarding military bases could be explained economically. As acknowledged by the Emir himself, Qatar is economically-reliant on China’s demand for crude oil, petrochemicals and natural gas. China has a positive relationship with Iran; providing Iran with missiles and arms throughout the 1980s during America’s embargo, it is the biggest importer of Iranian oil and has provided support to the Houthis in Yemen (Iran’s allies). Further, China, Iran and Russia engaged in trilateral discussions throughout 2025. If Qatar facilitated a possible ‘Operation Iranian Freedom’, they risk economic devastation in the event of Chinese trade retaliation. Perhaps a focus on self-determination, diplomatic neutrality and economic necessity pushed Qatar to refuse involvement; signalling to the US that national interests have superseded international friendliness. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has recently shifted to diplomacy and soft power. Abandoning previous “confrontational and interventionist posture”, Saudi has turned to “bridge-building”. In 2014, when an attack on Aramco’s oil infrastructure was attributed to Iran, Riyadh responded with de-escalation talks. Just like Qatar, Saudi Arabia acknowledges a contemporary “multipolar world order.” While security alliances with the US are “preserved”, new bonds are also being forged with Moscow and Beijing; “notably, it has refused to follow the U.S. and European push to isolate Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion and continues to work with Russia on oil policy”. There is, of course, the deterrent of Iranian retaliation towards the states. Iran has the proven capacity to attack key infrastructure, and the motivation to increase violent regional non-state actors’ funding for by-proxy payback. There is likely little confidence in US support in the event of payback, given its history of conflict ignition followed by unceremonious exit in the region (withdrawal from the region after the Iraq War, the handling of the Arab Spring, and the reluctant response to the 2019 Abqaiq attack). Facing a destabilised and vengeful Iran without Washington’s aid or China’s pivotal export revenue is likely an unattractive proposition for both nations. Overall, though, it appears that neither Gulf State is interested in playing satellite to American interventionism anymore (especially since public sentiment may oppose facilitation of a war waged against a fellow Muslim nation) – prioritising détente-esque mediation, self-determination and economic security. The Iranian Response Matrix Iran has faced international backlash since the 1979 Revolution, usually in the form of harsh oil and trade sanctions (since 1995). Persistent refusal to suspend its nuclear weapons programme, humanitarian concerns, armed conflict with Israel (long-time US ally) and continued funding of regional militias (Houthis, Hamas, Shiite groups) can explain this backlash. As a result of continued global opposition, Iran poses several responsive threats to an American attack. Direct military retaliation would likely be limited and symbolic, mainly to signal national resolve without incurring the costs and risks of an all out war. US military bases in the region could be targeted by ballistic and cruise missiles from Iranian soil; the January 2020 retaliatory strike on the Ain al-Asad base (for Soleimani’s murder) demonstrates precedent for proportionate, non-fatal symbolic actions. There is also the possibility of targeting or closing the Strait of Hormuz, with inevitable global economic consequences due to the vitality of the waterway to international trade. Iran could also respond through proxy conflicts and ally-led escalations. Iran’s continued allegiance with regional militias means retaliation could entail increased funding for Lebanon’s Hezbollah (long-time threat to Israel), Yemen’s Houthis (potential drone and missile threat to key Gulf infrastructure) and Iraq’s Shiite militias (who would already oppose US involvement due to the disasters of 2003). Cyber warfare and infrastructural sabotage are also possible. As demonstrated during the Iran-Israel conflict in 2025, cyber threats range “from sophisticated espionage and data exfiltration to disruptive and destructive attacks”, with a key focus on “psychological manipulation”, public fearmongering and social division exacerbation. The Iranian government and private contractors conduct these operations, allowing “flexibility and efficiency”. The Ayatollah Khamenei is the central authority overseeing these efforts and continues to fund a litany of APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) groups such as MuddyWater (focusing on espionage and critical infrastructure disruption using phishing, malware and legitimate tool abuse) and Magic Hound (notorious for social engineering and targeting professionals who oppose Iran’s government). As society and warfare become increasingly defined by technological advancements, and we enter an era of digital, dynamic, hybridised “new wars” (Kaldor), the Iranian penchant for cyber warfare poses a very real threat to the US and its allies. There is also the possibility of short-term inertia as a form of strategic patience. Iran’s regional allies (such as Houthis, Hezbollah, Al-Assad’s Syrian regime) have been weakened, if not deposed in Al-Assad’s case. Lacking firepower to combat US activity, Iran could tactically withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a deterrence signal (a bad idea since Iran will not yet have nuclear capability, just the intent to develop it, thus America may launch a harsh pre-emptive attack). Iran may simply stay in the Treaty and develop weapons quietly; America’s recent moves on the global chessboard demonstrate that the international playbook of rules and acceptable behaviours is increasingly irrelevant. The American Motivation The US is supposedly considering intervention in Iraq due to human rights abuses and violent repression. Trump vehemently opposes the murder of protestors, yet experts maintain it is unclear what he seeks in the region. I’d cautiously disagree. It is important to note the hypocrisy here: the US condemns Iranian governmental repression but never actually ratified the Convention on Human Rights itself, seeing it as “a value and not a policy”. The Trump administration has, obviously not to the same extent, responded violently to its own national insurgency problems: the National Guard has been deployed in Democratic US cities (a gross circumvention of federal law), border control officers have arrested citizens (including minors) without cause, attacked (and killed, in the case of Renee Nicole Good) nonviolent protestors and are actively running detention camps. This is not the same as killing (reportedly) over 2,500 protestors, but it does beg questions regarding what gives one repressive regime an ethical imperative to intervene in another’s violence. If we table a moral motive on the basis of hypocrisy, other US motives for intervention can be examined. Cynical observers may suggest threatened US intervention can be explained by its pursuit of primacist hegemony. America’s history of intervention, in Iran (deposition of Mossadegh), Iraq (execution of Saddam Hussein) and many other nations, generally has the implicit motive of installing governments more amenable to US interests. Outrage over recent Iranian repression may simply be a casus belli – not actual moral concern. Cautious American-Israeli support for the exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi could be explained by the Prince’s focus on industrialisation, which could offer profitable construction contracts to US firms, and secularisation, reducing the influence of Islamic dogma in the region which the US has long opposed. The US supports many repressive regimes (e.g. Israel, Saudi Arabia, El Salvador), favouring ‘realpolitik’ over ethical idealism; if mass executions and codified misogyny in Saudi Arabia do not beget US opposition, why is Iranian brutality morally unacceptable? Their motive for invasion may have more to do with nuclear non-proliferation (ensuring Iran cannot pose a threat to American military might) or with securing access to Iran’s substantial oil reserves (and eliminating a rogue nation within the oil markets as well as securing decisive leverage over oil-dependent European and Asian nations). Having been partially responsible for these protests in the first place – US-led economic sanctions, among other factors, led to the currency crisis which sparked December’s protests – one wonders whether intervention is simply the “seven countries in five years” plan for regional hegemony in a humanitarian disguise. ‘Shifting Sands’ and the Implications of Conflict There is currently no concrete answer as to what comes next. Recent updates tell us killing in Iran has stopped yet Trump still hasn’t ruled out military action, and that staff have exited Qatari military bases after Iran warned regional nations that it would attack US bases if an American assault was launched. Tensions are high and death tolls are higher. The Gulf Cooperation Council faces a complex dilemma: the Saudi-Iranian détente (2023) sets a precedent for hedging, and angering a powerful neighbour to appease a transatlantic ally is unappealing. Regional conflict (likely considering the armed militias and underlying disputes in the region) would threaten the GCC’s core economic goals. They are both protected and made targets by existing regional US military presence; the undesirable outcomes of energy market volatility, trade disruption and refugee crises are thus highly plausible. Realists may suggest this threat of armed, economically-demaging conflict could encourage increased regional pre-emptive militarisation, perhaps rejecting US-satellite status in favour of personal power and defense building, and escalating tensions in the process by becoming another threat to American primacy. Other global powers face similar quandaries. The UK shares the historical shame of the 2003 Iraq invasion – contemporaily deemed unlawful (defied UNSC resolutions) and inhumane (troops’ routine use of torture on Iraqi prisoners). As British internal political divisions intensify, commitments to US intervention would likely be unpopular with our fragmented electorate. The European Union may also be reluctant to commit support, not only because of the costs of war, the possibility of increased migrant flows and the implications for energy security, but also due to American intentions to influence European politics. Trump plans on “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations” and ensuring the rise of far-right nationalist parties. Already facing threatened sovereignty, blindly following America into another conflict signals to the public that European political power (and democratic strength) is eroding, and perhaps shows the US that the Western world will bow to its primacist pursuits. Russia and China, strategic allies of convenience against the US-led world order, may actually stand to benefit from an Iran-US conflict. Russia can enjoy increased oil revenues if limited access to Iranian oil boosts market prices, as well as expanded anti-American sentiment and profitable arms supplication opportunities. China may benefit from the displacement of US power (positioning itself as a business-first, non-ideological US alternative) yet also straddles a precarious tightrope: as the world’s largest crude oil importer, they require working relationships with both Iran and the US-allied GCC states. Conclusion The threat of US intervention in Iran may act as a geopolitical stress test, deepening fault lines, exacerbating regional sectarian conflict and forcing often-neutral nations to pick sides – accepting American primacist ‘humanitarianism’ or standing with Iran against it. The Gulf States face superpower backlash no matter their choices, the EU’s limited military power and vulnerability to American influence are highlighted internationally and other global superpowers may be preparing their own strategic power-plays. Tensions are unpredictable, Tehran’s regime volatile, and the US, as ever, promising its unique form of “help.”