Why Indonesia's Chinese Jet Fighter Choice is a Strategic Misfit

The modernization of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) remains an unresolved and persistently unsatisfactory issue. Although the defense budget has seen incremental increases, an allocation of below 1% of GDP is still considered insufficient. This challenge is further compounded by numerous other defense expenditures, such as personnel salaries and equipment maintenance. At the same time, the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) has not been out of the spotlight. Several incidents have underscored that the requirement for new equipment is a matter that can no longer be overlooked. President Prabowo Subianto, who previously served as defense minister, has undertaken various initiatives to modernize the TNI-AU. Nevertheless, Prabowo is noted for his propensity to authorize “glamorous” defense acquisitions. Prabowo has also, at times, exhibited a tendency toward hastiness. This was evident in his proposal to acquire a small fleet of second-hand, French-made Mirage fighter jets from Qatar. The initiative ultimately failed to materialize because of insufficient funding. To date, TNI-AU has sealed procurement deals that can be categorized as marquee acquisitions, such as the French-made Dassault Rafale and the Turkish-made fifth-generation aircraft, the Kaan. Although broadly popular with the Indonesian public, critics contend that these procurement programs are poorly conceived. The conflict between India and Pakistan has prompted Jakarta to glance at the Chinese-made J-10 fighter jet. In mid-October 2025, Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin confirmed that Indonesia would acquire the J-10. This jet is currently a highly sought-after item for countries that need to modernize their air forces. International interest in the J-10 fighter extends beyond Indonesia. A number of countries, such as Iran, Egypt, and Bangladesh, are considering its acquisition. Questionable and Disorganized Modernization The prudence of this acquisition needs critical assessment. First, Jakarta must understand that the success of the J-10 fighter jet stems from a complex, novel concept of warfare that has not yet been implemented by most air forces. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has implemented a network-centric beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagement model rather than a close-range dogfight, made possible largely by advancements in electronic warfare (EW) systems, particularly airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) technologies. The J-10’s performance in the India-Pakistan conflict underscores a doctrinal shift toward a different type of warfare. It reflects an integrated network approach that emphasizes information dominance, situational awareness, and interoperability, marking a transition from a traditional focus on motion and agility. Instead of a single fighter handling target acquisition and guidance, the PAF shares real-time sensor data across multiple platforms. Initial tracking from multiple radars is relayed to patrolling fighters that fire BVR missiles, after which AEW&C platforms assume mid-course guidance to ensure accuracy. Conversely, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has encountered interoperability difficulties, which have limited the operational advantages the IAF could otherwise gain. The TNI remains a nascent actor in the realm of electromagnetic domain. The deployment of a new, integrated tactical datalink system, scheduled for 2024, marks a notable advance in this domain. Nonetheless, the system’s practical utility in a contested environment remains unproven. Because of these facts, the TNI-AU would also need to acquire compatible AEW&C systems and EW technologies, as well as corresponding air-to-air missiles. Indonesia cannot make such purchases offhandedly, as failing to ensure system compatibility would further complicate interoperability, risking the J-10 will not perform like how the PAF operates. Unlike the TNI-AU, most of the PAF equipment is Chinese-made. China has never been a major defense partner for Indonesia; military cooperation between the two countries remains limited, with few instances of arms acquisitions or personnel training. The procurement process is also marked by ambiguity. A further complicating issue, with potentially significant implications, is the ongoing uncertainty over whether Indonesia is purchasing the J-10C or the less advanced J-10B variant. The newly obtained variant represents a substantial strategic variable that demands serious consideration, since the PAF utilized the J-10C fighter aircraft during the conflict with India. Should Jakarta anticipate that the TNI-AU must achieve a level of performance comparable to the PAF, the acquisition of the less advanced J-10B variant would present a significant and perplexing strategic discrepancy. Second, the procurement will be financed using foreign loans, which will further exacerbate Indonesia’s financial burden. Previously, the recent inauguration of new units and the establishment of new positions for senior officers within the Indonesian military raised concerns regarding the potential for this expanded organizational structure to become a fiscally inefficient institution. Furthermore, prestige-oriented procurement is also evident within other branches of the military. For instance, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is also undertaking substantial procurement, with the forthcoming acquisition of an Italian aircraft carrier for its future fleet. The TNI-AL also plans to acquire Houbei-class fast attack craft from China. Akin to the situation faced by the TNI-AU, the TNI-AL’s operational capabilities are marred by the obsolescence of its equipment. The High Price of Autonomy Indeed, the historical legacy of the arms embargo in the late 1990s continues to shape Indonesian defense policy, manifesting in a pronounced reliance on supplier diversification. For Jakarta, it is rational to diversify its international defense partnerships to avoid over-reliance on a single external partner. However, a critical consequence of this approach is the challenge of interoperability, as the Indonesian military now operates equipment sourced from a disparate range of over 30 supplier nations. This has often been a topic of criticism, as it will increase logistics and maintenance costs for an armed force known for its financial constraints. Concurrently, Jakarta must also understand that defense procurement is not a trivial geopolitical issue. It will be considered unfriendly behavior for other parties. Even though Indonesia’s relations with China are warmer since Prabowo took office, some issues, such as the South China Sea, remain sensitive. Indonesia must remain careful in managing the uncertainty of the geopolitical landscape, particularly as its strategic acquisitions risk straining relations with the United States. A precedent for this concern was established during Donald Trump’s first administration (2017–2021), when Washington, invoking the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), exerted significant pressure on Jakarta. This led to the cancellation of a planned procurement of Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters, demonstrating the tangible impact of US legislation on Indonesia’s defense modernization efforts and underscoring the challenges of navigating between major powers. The acquisition of fighter jets is a requisite component of the modernization of Indonesia’s aerial defense capabilities. Nevertheless, Jakarta must judiciously evaluate the financing schemes, personnel readiness, and doctrinal updates to ensure modernization achieves optimal utility. Should the procurement be enforced through a fiscally strained state budget, it would add more burden, while the TNI capabilities remain unchanged.